In a series of papers I am developing the research program of angsty metaethics, which involves making and defending evaluative comparisons between different metaethical possibilities (that is, ways the world might be, metaethically speaking). In particular, I explore and defend pro-realism, the position that it is bad if moral realism is false. The most important paper from this project, "Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst," is forthcoming in an upcoming edition of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

In normative ethics I am working on a paper with Keshav Singh that explores how moral responsibility and blameworthiness for wrongdoing not only can be lowered in light of non-culpable ignorance, but can sometimes be heightened by levels of familiarity with the wrongdoing that go beyond mere knowledge. For example, a torturer who knows that torture is wrong is blameworthy, but we might think that a torturer who not only knows that torture is wrong but also knows what torture is like from the inside, is even more blameworthy. This project raises a series of interconnected issues about blame, acquaintance, reason-possession, and much else, which Keshav and I hope to explore in future papers.

At the intersection of ethics and epistemology, I am also interested puzzles having to do with the apparent inappropriateness of deferring to moral testimony and exploring what these puzzles tell us not only about metaethics, but about the content of the true moral theory. My "Moral Realism and Reliance on Moral Testimony," published in Philosophical Studies, is devoted to this issue.



My current work in epistemology focuses on social epistemology, especially as it involves problems arising out of our shared epistemic lives. For example, what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company arises when we encounter agreement about what is true from sources that we deem either epistemically or morally suspect.


I am also working on a paper on deference, self-censorship, and identity politics in which I distinguish between implicated and unimplicated participants relative to political issues, and explore to what extent this distinction can help to define the contours of appropriate engagement in contentious political debate.



Since its revival in the mid-20th century, philosophy of religion has been most influenced by concepts, problems, and texts located squarely within the Christian tradition. Both my research and teaching in philosophy of religion brings distinctly Jewish concepts, problems, and texts to bear on contemporary problems. For example, I published a paper ("Heschel, Hiddenness, and the God of Israel") that draws inspiration from Abraham Joshua Heschel in responding to the problem of divine hiddenness.


Just recently I published a chapter on how theological ethics relates to communal-level injustices in The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability, Gender, Race, and Animals, edited by Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe.